

## Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF/E:DFWATERMAN:SEH  
APPROVED BY AF:NDAVIS  
AF/E:WBCOOTE  
H:RFLATEN(SUBST)  
NEA:LSEMAKIS(SUBST)  
S/CCT:JGATCH(SUBST)  
S/S: MR. EALUM  
P - MR. HUTSON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 127500 TOSEC 020209

EXDIS

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SU, OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO - NORMALIZING OUR RELATIONS TOWARD  
SUDAN

REF: SECTO 2044  
FROM DAVIS:  
FOR THE SECRETARY THROUGH SISCO: DELIVER SISCO IN SALZBURG

1. THE SITUATION - SINCE JUNE 1974 OUR POLICY TOWARD THE  
SUDAN HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY A SUSPENSION OF ASSISTANCE  
PROGRAMS AND BILATERAL COOPERATION. IN RECENT WEEKS OUR  
AMBASSADOR HAS URGED THAT WE BEGIN TO AMEND OUR POLICY  
TOWARD SUDAN. ON MAY 28, UNDER SECRETARY SISCO APPROVED  
AF'S RECOMMENDATION THAT WE AUTHORIZE REINSTITUTION OF  
EX-IM AND OPIC AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD EVENTUAL RESUMPTION  
OF NORMAL RELATIONS. YOU HAVE ASKED FOR AN ANALYSIS AND  
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RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE GENERAL QUESTION OF NORMAL-  
IZATION AND THE STEPS THROUGH WHICH IT MIGHT PROCEED.

2. BACKGROUND - FOLLOWING PRESIDENT NIMEIRI'S DECISION

LAST JUNE TO RELEASE TO THE PLO THE CONVICTED PALESTINIAN ASSASSINS OF TWO US DIPLOMATS, THE USG PUBLICLY EXPRESSED ITS STRONG DISAPPOINTMENT, RECALLED ITS AMBASSADOR FOR

CONSULTATIONS AND CURTAILED ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE SUDAN.

3. YOU AUTHORIZED AMBASSADOR BREWER TO RETURN TO KHARTOUM IN NOVEMBER 1974, AND AT THE SAME TIME THE US GAVE AGREEMENT FOR A NEW SUDANESE AMBASSADOR. ALTHOUGH WE BEGAN TO RESUME ROUTINE DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS, WE MAINTAINED A POLICY OF HOLDING IN ABEYANCE PLANS AND REQUESTS FOR US ASSISTANCE. THE AFSA BOARD URGED THIS POLICY THEN AND HAS MAINTAINED A CONTINUING AND STRONG INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT EVER SINCE.

4. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD WHEN THE DECISION WAS TAKEN THAT THE FREEZE ON ASSISTANCE TO THE GOS WOULD BE TEMPORARY AND THAT AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME WE WOULD INITIATE A THAWING PROCESS. ACCORDINGLY, OVER THE PAST FIVE MONTHS WE HAVE GRADUALLY TAKEN STEPS WITHIN THE TOLERANCE ALLOWED BY THE POLICY GUIDELINES TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IN THE SUDAN.

5. WE HAD APPROACHED THE LIMIT OF FLEXIBILITY WHICH COULD BE EXERCISED UNDER THE POLICY GUIDELINES ISSUED LAST AUGUST. I RECOMMENDED THAT WE AMEND THE GUIDELINES AND INITIATE STEPS TOWARD NORMALIZATION.

6. ANALYSIS - THE POLICY OF RESTRAINT TOWARD SUDAN WAS DESIGNED TO CONVEY OUR DISPLEASURE TO THE SUDANESE AND OTHERS OVER PRESIDENT NIMEIRI'S RELEASE OF THE KHARTOUM ASSASSINS. FROM STATEMENTS MADE BY THE SUDANESE LEADERSHIP, IT IS EVIDENT THAT MESSAGE HAS BEEN UNDERSTOOD. THE ARAB WORLD IN GENERAL AND EGYPT IN PARTICULAR ARE AWARE OF OUR CURRENT POLICY. (EGYPT CONTINUES TO HOLD THE KHARTOUM MURDERERS IN DETENTION.) MAINTAINING THAT POLICY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE US WAS NOT SIMPLY MAKING A SHOW OF CONFIDENTIAL

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DISPLEASURE, THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN (GOS) ACTION WAS DEEPLY OPPOSED IN SOME DOMESTIC CIRCLES AND THAT EGYPTIAN RELEASE OF THE TERRORISTS COULD EVOKE A NEGATIVE REACTION IN CONGRESS THAT COULD AFFECT OUR AID PROGRAM IN EGYPT.

7. UNALTERED EXTENSION OF THAT POLICY WOULD IN OUR VIEW PRODUCE SIGNIFICANTLY DIMINISHING RETURNS AND ESCALATE THE RISKS TO OUR INTERESTS IN THE SUDAN AND THE REGION. THERE IS NOTHING MORE TO ADD TO THE POLICY AND CLEARLY THERE IS NO WAY OF REVERSING THE ORIGINAL NIMEIRI DECISION TO RELEASE THE TERRORISTS. (WE NEVER EXPECTED HIM TO DO SO.) SUDAN HAS CONTINUED TO WELCOME AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN ITS MARKET, MUCH ENHANCED BY ACCESS TO PETRODOLLARS.

THIS GOOD WILL PRESUMABLY IS NOT OPEN-ENDED AND REQUIRES SOME USG RECIPROCATION. BESIDES INHIBITING THE ABILITY OF AMERICAN FIRMS TO COMPETE IN SUDAN, OUR "HOLD" ON AUTHORIZATION FOR EX-IM AND OPIC PROGRAMS ALSO PRODUCED SPILL-OVER EFFECTS ON GENERAL US PARTICIPATION IN ARAB INVESTMENT DEALS. BOTH EX-IM AND OPIC INDICATED THEIR DESIRE TO BE ALLOWED TO DO BUSINESS AGAIN IN THE SUDAN.

8. THE GOS HAS AVOIDED RECRIMINATIONS AND HAS INDICATED ITS HOPE FOR BETTER COOPERATION WITH US. NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WOULD INSURE AND ENHANCE OUR INFLUENCE (LIMITED IN ANY CASE) ON THE GOS WHICH CONTINUES TO TAKE A MODERATE POSITION ON MIDDLE EASTERN ISSUES, TO FOLLOW A BALANCED NON-ALIGNED FOREIGN POLICY AND TO PURSUE MEDIATION OF THE ERITREAN CONFLICT. ARAB NEIGHBORS WOULD VIEW FAVORABLY A RESUMPTION BY THE US OF NORMAL RELATIONS WITH SUDAN.

9. CONTINUED PROGRESS TOWARD NORMALIZATION WOULD FOSTER US INTERESTS IN THE SUDAN AND ITS REGION. THE DIA WANTS TO REOPEN A DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE IN KHARTOUM TO AUGMENT ITS RESOURCES IN THE AREA. WE SHARE THE AMBASSADOR'S VIEW THAT THE PRESENCE OF A DEFENSE ATTACHE WOULD LEAD THE SUDANESE TO REQUEST AND EXPECT REINTRODUCTION OF A MODEST MAP TRAINING PROGRAM. THE NAVY DESIRES TO MAKE

PERIODIC CALLS AT PORT SUDAN. AUTHORIZATION FOR MAP  
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TRAINING, MILITARY SALES AND TRANSFERS WOULD ENCOURAGE NIMEIRI TO ALLOW US ACCESS TO ITS PORTS AND AIRFIELDS AND TO AVOID OVER-DEPENDENCY ON OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGES TO THE USSR. REINSTITUTION OF A MODEST AID PROGRAM WOULD FURTHER PROMOTE OUR INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF US PRIVATE INVESTMENT.

10. NORMALIZATION OF OUR RELATIONS WITH SUDAN WOULD GENERATE CHARGES FROM AFSA AND POSSIBLY OTHER DOMESTIC ELEMENTS THAT WE ARE WEAKENING OUR RESOLVE AGAINST TERRORISM. WHILE THE DECISION TO AUTHORIZE EX-IM AND OPIC PROGRAMS CAN BE JUSTIFIED ON THE GROUNDS IT PRIMARILY BENEFITS AMERICAN INVESTORS, REINTRODUCTION OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE WOULD PROVOKE MORE SERIOUS OBJECTIONS FROM CONGRESSMEN AND OTHER AMERICAN CRITICS INTERESTED IN THE ISSUE. ARABS AND OTHERS MAY BELIEVE WE ARE READJUSTING OUR POLICY BECAUSE OF ARAB COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL PRESSURES AND COULD CONCLUDE THAT WE ARE LESS THAN RESOLUTE IN OUR OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM. IT WOULD WEAKEN OUR EFFORTS TO KEEP THE EGYPTIANS FROM BOWING TO RADICAL ARAB PRESSURE CALLING FOR RELEASE OF THE KHARTOUM MURDERERS.

11. NEXT STEPS - WE PLAN TO EXAMINE THE SITUATION AGAIN IN JULY AND AUGUST WHEN AMBASSADOR BREWER IS IN THE DEPT ON CONSULTATIONS WITH A VIEW TOWARD TAKING FURTHER STEPS TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. FOLLOWING THAT REVIEW AND ASSUMING A SATISFACTORY EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPMENTS, I WOULD ANTICIPATE RECOMMENDING THAT WE AUTHORIZE:

-- DIA TO BEGIN PREPARATION FOR A DEFENSE ATTACHE TO ARRIVE IN KHARTOUM IN EARLY 1976.

-- DOD TO INCLUDE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES A SMALL AMOUNT (E.G. \$50,000) FOR MAP TRAINING IN ITS FY 1977 BUDGET.

-- AID TO REVIEW PROGRAMS EARLIER SHELVED FOR POSSIBLE REINTRODUCTION IN FY 77.

-- PL-480 TITLE I GRAIN SALES.

-- NAVY TO PLAN FOR PERIODIC PORT CALLS AT PORT SUDAN IN CONFIDENTIAL

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LATE 1975 OR EARLY 1976.

-- EMBASSY AND CU TO PLAN FOR EXPANDED PROGRAM IN 1976.

12. IF THE ABOVE SCENERIO IS EVENTUALLY ACCEPTED, I WOULD EXPECT TO RECOMMEND WE INFORM THE SUDANESE IN THE LATTER PART OF THIS YEAR OF OUR INTENTION TO PROCEED WITH THE ABOVE PROGRAMS. AT THE SAME TIME WE WOULD WANT TO REITERATE TO EGYPT THAT OUR CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SUDAN IN NO WAY REFLECTS A LESSENING OF OUR CONCERN THAT THE KHARTOUM TERRORISTS REMAIN IN DETENTION.

13. BY MID-1976 WE WOULD ANTICIPATE RESUMPTION OF NORMAL RELATIONS AND PROGRAMS IN SUDAN. THESE WOULD INCLUDE A DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE, ROUTINE NAVY PORT CALLS, MODEST MAP TRAINING, NORMAL MILITARY SALES AND TRANSFERS, AND A MODEST AID PROGRAM.

14. THE SPECIFIC TIMETABLE RECOMMENDED ABOVE HAS NOT YET BEEN DISCUSSED WITH AID OR DOD. NEA, H AND S/CCT HAVE CLEARED IN SUBSTANCE. INGERSOLL

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 26 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** FOREIGN RELATIONS, TOSEC, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION, BANK LOANS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 01 JUN 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** CunninFX  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975STATE127500  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** AF/E:DFWATERMAN:SEH  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** D750191-0599  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750699/baaaalkm.tel  
**Line Count:** 209  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN SS  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** CunninFX  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 09 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <09 APR 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <16 SEP 2003 by CunninFX>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** n/a  
**TAGS:** PFOR, EFIN, US, SU, OPIC, XMB, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)  
**To:** SECRETARY  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006